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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we take up a question, which has a longstanding tradition within the field 
of European Union (EU) studies: What explains the variation in public support for European 
integration and/or the European Union? There are two dominant explanations of EU support: 
the utilitarian self-interest and the national identity perspectives. The former viewpoint 
stresses that citizens are more likely to support integration, if it results in a net benefit to the 
national economy or their own pocketbook. The latter perspective highlights the importance 
of feelings of national identity in shaping support for European integration. Drawing on the 
concept of (double) allegiance, we argue that there are theoretical reasons to combine the 
interest- and identity-based perspectives into one single explanatory framework. Support for 
supra-national institutions depends on the extent to which such institutions allow national 
political elites to provide security and well-being. The more citizens perceive that integration 
threatens their (economic, social-psychological and/or socio-economic) security and well-
being,  the less they are likely to support the EU. We find empirical evidence that interest- and 
identity-based explanations should indeed not be seen as alternative explanations, but as 
perspective that capture different sides of the same coin.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Until the beginning of the 1990s European integration was largely uncontested in 
public opinion. Recently, however, most European Union (EU) member states have witnessed 
a – sometimes quite dramatic – drop in public support for European integration (see table 1). 
In the early years, the European project was characterized by the well-known “permissive 
consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). The general perception that the EU would 
secure peace, stability and welfare for its member states apparently generated a diffuse feeling 
of approval of a daring project to which political elites had committed themselves. With the 
creation of the European (Economic) Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of a single 
currency, the vast expansion of policy areas, the delegation of more and more competencies to 
the jurisdiction in Brussels, and the EU enlargement, the speed of the European project has 
gained full momentum. However, with this ever growing importance of the EU to the lives of 
its citizens, the integration process itself has become contested (Steenbergen and Marks 
2004:1). Questions are being raised where the train of European integration is heading, who is 
in the driver’s seat and whether it should go so fast. Such uncertainties seem to have 
manifested themselves in a disintegration of the permissive consensus and a decline in support 
for European integration among the EU public. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s public support for European integration has been in 
decline (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996, Eichenberg and Dalton 2003; see table 1). The 
referendum outcomes in Denmark, Ireland, the recent Swedish referendum on the Euro, the 
ever so low turnout in the elections to the European Parliament, and the levels of support for 
EU-skeptical parties in several national elections, show the contemporary shift away from 
support for European integration. Eichenberg and Dalton (2003) refer to this decline in public 
support for European integration in most member states as the “Post-Maastricht Blues”, as the 
drop occurred after the finalizing of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. The transition 
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of the European Community (EC) to the European Union laid down in the Treaty of 
Maastricht characterizes the transformation from a mere intergovernmental political regime 
with primarily economic competencies into a supranational regime with increased political 
competencies (Fuchs 2002:1). The post-Maastricht transition to the EMU, and particularly its 
convergence criteria, has brought the EU into the arena of domestic redistribution by 
influencing the fiscal policies of its member states.  
 
Table 1: Change in Support for European Integration, 1991–2003 
 
 ∆ in Support European Integration, 
1991–2003 
EU-15 average -16.5  
France -17.0  
Belgium -14.0  
Netherlands  -18.5  
Germany -15.0  
Italy -12.0  
Luxembourg +1.0  
Denmark -1.0  
Ireland +3.0  
United Kingdom - 16.0  
Greece -8.5  
Spain  -6.5  
Portugal -4.0  
Finland* -6.0  
Sweden* +4.5  
Austria* +6.5  
* The percentage changes in support for European integration (% of respondents 
answering that one’s country EU membership is a good thing) summarized in this table 
display the changes in the several member states between 1991 and 2003, except for 
three countries, in which the changes documented correspond to different time-periods: 
Finland, 1993-2003, and Sweden and Austria, 1994-2003. Source: Eurobarometer (EB) 
Trend file plus single EB surveys from 2000-2003. 
 
How can we explain this trend in public support for European integration? Within the 
extensive literature on EU support two dominant perspectives have emerged: the utilitarian 
self-interest and the national identity perspectives. Authors within the utilitarian approach 
assert that citizens are more likely to support integration, if it results in a net benefit to the 
national economy or their own pocketbook (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 
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1995, Anderson and Reichert 1995). Others, however, highlight the importance of feelings of 
national identity in shaping support for European integration (Carey and Lebo 2000, Carey 
2002, McLaren 2002). In section 2.1 we present a review of this literature. 
Following the lead of recent studies that have shown that both utilitarian reasoning and 
national identity are important determinants of support for supranational institutions (Hooghe 
and Marks 2004, Netjes 2004), we argue that there are theoretical reasons to suppose that the 
utilitarian approach and the identity perspective tap into the same causal mechanisms 
underlying the attitudes of European publics to integration. It is for this reason that both 
interest- and identity-based explanations fit into one single explanatory framework of support 
for European integration. Hence, rather than framing interest- and identity-based explanations 
as exclusive alternatives or as two separate predictions that inexplicably seem to be “working” 
empirically, we suggest a causal mechanism that explains why both rival theories are, in fact, 
simultaneously correct. For this purpose, we develop (in section 2.2) the concept of political 
allegiance, present an operationalization that tries to capture its theoretical drift and test our 
hypothesis using public opinion data collected in the 60.1 Eurobarometer survey from 
November 2003 (sections 3 and 4). 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Theories of Support for European integration 
 
Within the last ten years an extensive literature has evolved to explain the micro 
foundations of public support for European integration. Although more than 100 publications 
have been written on this specific topic, no scholarly consensus has been reached so far. 
 4 
Theories explaining public support for European integration can generally be grouped into 
explanations based on utilitarian self-interest and national identity (Hooghe and Marks 
2004:1).  
The utilitarian approach relies on self-interested explanations of political attitudes and 
suggests that citizens are more likely to support integration, if it results in a net personal of 
national benefit (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995, Anderson and 
Reichert 1995, Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996, Gabel 1998). So, citizens support European 
integration if and when they feel that EU membership is consistent with their economic 
interests. The utilitarian perspective approaches the relationship between economic interests 
and support for European integration in two ways. A first group of authors (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 1993, Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996) suggests that EU support is consistent with 
national economic performance. Using aggregated time-series analyses, these authors show 
that support for European integration varies in accordance with patterns of macroeconomic 
performance – the latter is measured using changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) and unemployment rates.1 This macro-level explanation 
emphasizes the impact of macroeconomic factors on support for European integration. 
The second conceptualization of the relationship between economic interests and support 
for European integration focuses on microeconomic considerations (Gabel and Palmer 1995, 
Anderson and Reichert 1995, Gabel 1998). The argument is that economic integration in 
Europe, which resulted in the creation of an international market for goods, labor and capital 
as well as a reallocation of economic resources throughout the EU, creates differential 
benefits for EU citizens (Gabel 1998:938). Research within this microeconomic approach 
                                                 
1 It is important to note, however, that recent studies examining the relationship between macroeconomic 
performance and EU support suggest that the explanatory power of macroeconomic considerations has declined 
after the Treaty of Maastricht. Eichenberg and Dalton (2003; 2004) show that whereas macroeconomic 
performance largely explains EU support prior to the Maastricht treaty, this relationship no longer holds. The 
authors conclude that, “[t]he contrast in the pre- and post-Maastricht periods indicates that as citizens became 
aware of the implications of the EMU and the EU’s changing policy role, their calculus for support changed” 
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provides evidence for the expectation that EU support varies on the basis of several 
socioeconomic characteristics. Or, to put it in the words of Gabel (1998:938), “[c]itizens 
derive varying economic benefits and losses from EU membership depending on their ability 
to exploit economic opportunities created by market liberalization.” Market liberalization 
creates differential benefits for citizens due to their income and education levels as well as on 
the basis of their employment status. On the one hand, it enables firms to shift production 
across borders, which intensifies job insecurity for especially the unskilled workers, while on 
the other hand it enables labor mobility for high-skilled or professional workers within the 
EU. Hence, authors within the microeconomic approach argue that EU membership favors 
citizens with higher levels of income, education and occupational skills (Gabel and Palmer 
1995, Anderson and Reichert 1995, Gabel 1998). Thus, this microeconomic approach stresses 
that individual benefits explain support for European integration. 
This utilitarian understanding of public support for European integration, however, is 
challenged by authors who point to national identity as an important explanation of (lack of) 
support for European integration (Carey 2002, Marks and Hooghe 2003, Hooghe and Marks 
2004, Netjes and Edwards 2004). McLaren (2002: 533) shows that “[a]ntipathy toward the 
EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations […] but about fear of, or hostility toward other 
cultures”. The identity explanation draws on psychology of group membership to consider 
how national identity influences support for European integration. When considering the 
influence of national identity on EU support, the EU is considered as a polity or regime that 
“overarches” national communities and as such can be the object of identification. The 
research thus far has found conflicting results. Whereas some studies argue that regional or 
national identity is consistent with European identity and support for European integration 
(Marks 1999, Haesly 2001), other research, in contrast, shows that national attachment 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Eichenberg & Dalton 2003: 19). Netjes (2004), however, finds that macroeconomic performance is still 
positively related to aggregate support for the EU. 
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combined with national pride have a significant negative effect on support for European 
integration (Carey 2002).  
Marks and Hooghe (2003) rightly argue that one needs to distinguish between several 
types of national identity, by evaluating the extent to which national identity is exclusive or 
inclusive. Individuals who conceive of their national identity as exclusive will consider 
supranational governance a threat, whereas those with multiple identities will be favorably 
disposed to governance beyond the nation-state. Moreover, national identities are variable, as 
they can be politicized, contested and constructed within national contexts (Marks and 
Hooghe 2003:21ff.). Surely, research on the origins of national identity highlights the 
socialization aspect of identity and the importance of myths, symbols and traditions in the 
development of “imagined communities” in this respect (Anderson 1992: 5–6). However, 
national identity is also seen to be subject to reinvention or reintepretation over time (Smith 
1991). 
So, although identities are shaped through socialization, one can expect political elites to 
influence national identity to a large extent. A study by Netjes and Edwards (2004) 
demonstrates the key role of populist rightwing parties in this respect. These parties mobilize 
exclusive national identity against European integration. EU-skeptical right-wing populist 
parties frame opposition to supranational governance with defense of the national community. 
These parties can hence be seen to provide citizens with negative cues regarding European 
integration (on cueing of public opinion, see Zaller 1992). This finding seems to concur with 
the recent experience of a rise in populist right-wing political parties in France, Denmark, 
Italy, and Austria. These parties tap nationalism to reject further integration and to defend the 
nation against control from Brussels. Hooghe et al. (2002) point out that such parties have 
formed the largest reservoir of Euroskepticism across the European Union since 1996. This 
result is also in line with findings on the cueing effects of political parties in the case of EU 
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support (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994, Steenbergen and Jones 2002). It seems that the 
human capacity for calculation is far more limited than utilitarian models presume (Chong 
2000, Kinder 1998). Hence, parties’ stances on European integration present citizens with 
cognitive short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest.  
Summing up, the core contribution of the authors within the national identity approach to 
EU support is that show that group loyalty affects support for European integration and that a 
citizen is not merely a homo economicus. Citizens “[…] evolved an emotional capacity for 
group loyalty long before the development of rational faculties, and such loyalties can be 
extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects.” (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 2) 
Although economic rationality may matter, feelings of national belonging prove to be the 
more powerful influence on public opinion towards European integration (Hooghe and Marks 
2004, Netjes 2004). 
 
 
2.2 Political Allegiance 
 
Both perspectives elaborated above attempt to explain variation in support for the EU and the 
process of European integration among individuals. However, both approaches suffer from 
ambiguity regarding the causal mechanisms underlying support. The utilitarian perspective 
seems to lack a clear specification of the causal mechanism that connects (perceived) 
economic benefits and support for the national government and the EU or European 
integration. Why exactly perceived benefits are routinely translated into a supportive 
European attitude remains somewhat underspecified. Although the identity-perspective draws 
on psychology, the problem of the causal mechanism seems to remain unresolved, too. For 
instance, Hooghe and Marks (2004: 2) notice that national identity is capable of both boosting 
 8 
and weakening support for European integration. To solve this unexpected inconsistency, they 
draw on a distinction between inclusive and exclusive identity, reasoning that persons with an 
exclusive national identity tend to be more skeptical towards European integration than 
individuals with nested multiple identities. Although we intuitively see the logic of this, the 
precise reason why an exclusive national identity necessarily precludes support for the EU, 
however, still remains unexplained. The conviction appears to be grounded in the implicit 
assumption that those who have an exclusive national territorial identity look at the EU as a 
polity that has – so to speak – “invaded” national territory. But some EU citizens with an 
exclusive national identity may very well be “intergovernmentalists” in their worldview and 
understand the EU in a Milwardian sense: a form of policy coordination and cooperation 
between nation-states that is capable of rescuing the nation-state and therefore the object and 
source of national identification. 
We propose the concept of allegiance as a solution to the under-specification of the causal 
mechanism in the utilitarian approach and the indeterminate reasoning of the identity 
approach. Security and well-being can be theorized as the major benefits for national publics 
offered by a government. For all political regimes holds that people are concerned about their 
material interests and their personal security. What Alexander assumes to be the case for 
authoritarian and democratic regimes (2002: 33), also holds, mutatis mutandis, for all 
regimes, including those developing into complicated multi-level systems of governance with 
extended delegation of competencies to other than the national level. First, citizens as political 
subjects care about their well-being, wanting to protect and advance their material and 
nonmaterial interests, including obviously their social-psychological equanimity. Second, they 
want to be reassured about their security, ranging from a preference for the lowest possible 
risk of experiencing violence to a desire for the most solid possible shelter against social and 
economic misfortune. 
 9 
This, then, poses the following general issue: under what conditions and to what extent do 
publics (the ruled) accept and support decisions and actions of their governments (the rulers) 
that seem to affect their well-being and security beyond their direct control? The general 
answer is that they do so on the condition that this guarantees or reinforces (territorial, 
physical, psychological, social and economic) security and well-being. This induces what we 
term “allegiance”, formally defined as the willingness of a national public to approve of and 
to support the decisions made by a government, in return for a more or less immediate and 
straightforward reward or benefit to which the public feels entitled on the basis of it having 
rendered approval and support (see extensively van Kersbergen 2000; 2003). Political 
allegiance is characterized by an exchange between a sovereign and the public, consisting of a 
trade-off between on the one hand security and well-being and support on the other. Both 
security and well-being are the major benefits for national publics offered by a government. 
Citizens in return offer their support to social and political institutions. 
The “goods” of security/well-being and support are varied and manifold. Security and 
well-being offered by a government can be territorial, physical, psychological, economic and 
social. It must in principle be understood in the broadest possible sense and ranges from 
issues of war and peace to economic (e.g., employment), social (e.g., income maintenance) 
and psychological (e.g. peace of mind; sense of belonging) security and well-being. Support 
offered by a public can be political, economic, social and civil and includes, for example, 
forms of social and political participation, the willingness to pay taxes and law-abidingness. 
In essence, allegiance is a relational concept: a subject has the right to be protected as well 
as the duty to obey and support and the ruler has both the right to decide and the duty to 
provide security. The stability of this exchange relationship is secured through trust and 
security rather than, for instance enforcement. 
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Political allegiance towards supranational institutions, in this particular case the EU, 
originates out of this public’s primary allegiance to the nation-state. This argument constitutes 
the core of the idea of “double allegiance”. Support for supranational institutions, i.e. double 
allegiance, is dependent on the extent to which supra-national institutions allow national 
political elites to provide these kinds of political, social, psychological and economic security 
and well-being (van Kersbergen 2000:4-9, 2003). This concept of double allegiance is in line 
with Milward’s (1992:3) suggestion that “(...) without the process of integration the West 
European nation-state might not have retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the 
way that it has. The European Community has been its buttress, an indispensable part of the 
nation-state’s post-war construction. Without it, the nation-state could not have offered to its 
citizens the same measure of security and prosperity which it has provided and which has 
justified its survival.” The process of European integration, on the one hand, safeguarded 
national allegiance, and on the other hand produced a secondary allegiance among national 
citizens, because the national publics understood that integration was necessary for providing 
security and well-being. Subsequently, secondary allegiance did not weaken primary 
allegiance. Rather, the former depended on the latter. 
 Hence, we define double allegiance or support for European integration as the 
evaluation of citizens of the extent to which supra-national institutions allow national political 
elites to provide political, social, psychological and economic security and well-being. 
Political allegiance towards the EU is conditioned by the willingness of national publics to 
“[…] accept the efforts of their national state elites to build trans- or supranational political 
institutions on the condition that this guarantees or reinforces economic and social security in 
the national context” (van Kersbergen 2000:4). So, support for supranational institutions may 
be low if individual citizens feel that these institutions threaten their security and well-being.  
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In sum, support for the EU and for the process of European integration can best be 
explained with the help of the concept of political allegiance. This concept, centering around a 
relationship of exchange between the political elite and the national public, allows for the 
inclusion of explanatory mechanisms that focus on interests as well as on feelings of national 
identity. The concept of political allegiance is based on the assumption that the public 
supports and submits to a government only if it is provided with protection, security and 
prosperity in return for this support. Political allegiance towards supranational institutions, in 
this particular case the EU, originates out of the public’s primary allegiance to the nation-
state. Accordingly, support for supra-national institutions depends on the extent to which 
supranational institutions allow national political elites to provide political, social-
psychological and socio-economic security and well-being. Support for (and obedience to) the 
EU tend to be low and problematic, when citizens feel that the process of European 
integration hampers their national political elites’ capacity to provide political, social-
psychological and socio-economic security and well-being. This fact is perceived and 
interpreted as jeopardizing their interests and their sense of national identity, reinforcing 
feelings of socio-economic, social-psychological and political insecurity which, in turn, 
corrode the “double” allegiance on which EU-support depends. We therefore hypothesize that 
the decreased support for the EU on the part of the European citizenry reflects the perception 
of citizens that the process of integration is threatening their core interests and/or feelings of 
national identity, heightening their social and economic anxiety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
3. Hypotheses, Variables, and Data 
 
In order to examine the concept of double allegiance and the main hypotheses 
elaborated in the previous section, we analyze public support for the EU and the process of 
European integration using public opinion data for the 15 “old” EU member states, collected 
in the 60.1 Eurobarometer survey form November 2003. We make a distinction between 
evaluations regarding the EU as such and citizens’ support for the process of European 
integration. This differentiation is important, as one can imagine that citizens may think 
differently about the EU as a system of governance and the process of further (essentially 
political) integration. Since the Treaty of Maastricht the nature of European integration has 
changed from an elite affair that was predominantly economic in character to one with a much 
more directly political quality. On the basis of these events, citizens may argue that the EU 
may so far have enabled national elites to secure prosperity and well-being, but that a 
furthering of integration may seriously hamper their activities. National publics may fear that 
further political integration and expansion of the Union to include new member states may 
jeopardize security and well-being. So, these arguments underpin why it is useful to 
differentiate between two types of support: support for the European Union (EU support) and 
support for the process of further European integration (EI support). 
The EB 60.1 survey includes several questions regarding the respondents’ evaluations 
of European integration. Using a principal component analysis, we first established that there 
are indeed two types of support, namely EU and EI support (the results of the principal 
component analysis are presented in appendix I). EU support is measured by an index 
consisting of four variables, that tap the respondents’ opinion whether 1) EU membership is a 
good thing, 2)  they would regret the dissolution of the EU, 3) they generally have a positive 
image of the EU and 4) the EU gives them a positive feeling (of enthusiasm, hope or trust). 
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The EI support index consists of three variables, gauging the respondents’ stances on further 
political integration and support for enlargement. The table in appendix II provides an 
overview of the exact question wordings of all the variables used.  
In the empirical analysis in the following section, we examine the applicability of the 
concept of political allegiance by testing two main hypotheses: First, we hypothesize that 
feelings of economic anxiety and exclusive identity are negatively related to EU and EI 
support. Secondly, we expect high levels of trust in national political institutions and 
satisfaction with national democracy to coincide with high levels of support for the EU and 
the integration process.  
 We also expect support for the EU and EI to be influenced by contextual factors, i.e. 
country characteristics. We hypothesize that feelings of economic anxiety and exclusive 
national identity to become contested and constructed within national contexts. Accordingly, 
we hypothesize interaction effects between exclusive national identity and the presence of a 
right-wing populist party (see appendix IV), between economic anxiety and radical left parties 
(see appendix V), and between economic anxiety and macroeconomic conditions, i.e. levels 
of inflation and unemployment. We further hypothesize that rightwing populist parties have a 
decisive role in mobilizing exclusive national identity against European integration. Such 
parties draw upon nationalism to reject further control from Brussels, thereby providing 
citizens with negative cues regarding European integration. Moreover, we also expect cueing 
effects of radical left parties. These parties also oppose European integration, but on different 
grounds than populist rightwing parties. Radical left parties oppose European integration on 
the basis of the neo-liberal character of economic integration. Hence, we expect these parties 
to take up feelings of economic anxiety and mobilize these fears against European integration. 
Finally, we expect that objective economic conditions, i.e. the level of inflation and 
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unemployment, influence subjective economic conditions. Hence, we expect the level of 
inflation and unemployment to interact with the extent of economic anxiety. 
 As controls, we include some individual level as well as country level variables. At the 
individual level, we include variables measuring employment status – manual and 
professional worker – to control for the utilitarian perspective. The expectation is that manual 
workers will show lower levels of support, whereas professionals – who are assumed to 
benefit from the EU and the integration process at large – will favor Europe. Membership in 
the EMU and the level of public expenditure are the country level dummies employed in the 
analysis. The dummy variable capturing EMU membership is incorporated into the analysis, 
as we expect that the presence of the Euro has decreased support for both the EU and the 
integration process among EU publics. The EMU was launched in the Maastricht Treaty and 
carries tremendous symbolic significance as it entailed the provision that in 2002 the national 
currencies were to be replaced by one common currency. The convergence criteria, which set 
the conditions for the transition to the Euro and after, have become highly contested, as they 
mainly focus on budgetary restraint and in turn can be seen to strain redistributive provisions. 
Overall, we expect membership in the EMU to have a negative effect on support for European 
integration. Public expenditure, on the other hand, is expected to have a positive effect on EU 
and EI support, as it reduces feelings of economic anxiety.  
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4. Model Specification and Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Regression Results 
 
In order to evaluate the relevance of the theoretical factors influencing EU support and 
EI support, we incorporate the predictors described in the previous section into a pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.2 The results of the pooled OLS regression 
analyses, presented in table 2 below, provides us with three important pieces of information. 
First of all, the regression coefficients enable us to estimate the relative weight of the 
individual predictors in explaining either EU or EI support. The individual estimates reported 
are the standardized regression coefficients, which allow us to approximate the relative effects 
of the respective predictors and compare the regression weights of all predictors. Secondly, 
the signs of the coefficients bare information regarding the direction of the estimated effects 
of the predictors, which allows to test the applicability of our general hypotheses. Thirdly, the 
R² estimates point at the portion of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained by 
the predictors in the respective models. In essence, a R² estimate points at the fit of the model.  
Table 2 displays the results of the regression analyses using support for the European 
Union and support of the process of European integration as the dependent variables. 
Moreover, we estimated two models for each dependent variable. The first model incorporates 
the predictors measuring exclusive national identity, economic anxiety, trust in national 
institutions and satisfaction with national democracy as well as two controls for the utilitarian 
explanations of support, namely manual and professional worker. The second model also 
includes dummy variables for those countries that are known to have an extraordinary high 
level of support for EU and EI, in this sample Portugal and Ireland, and those countries that 
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are known to have an above average skepticism towards the EU and the integration process, 
in this sample Sweden and the United Kingdom (see appendix III). 
The R² statistic reveals that the overall explanatory power is lower in respect to the 
explanation of support for European integration than for support for the European Union. 
Whereas the first set of models explain 22 respectively 28 percent of the variance of EU 
support, the latter set of models explain merely 15 and 18 percent of the variance in support 
for European integration. Consequently, we can conclude that although the predictors 
contribute significantly to both a explanation of EU and EI support (see the significant F-
statistic), the overall goodness-of-fit is better in the case of EU support, as our regression 
model accounts for a larger portion of the variance in EU support. 
The examination of the individual regression parameters in table 2 shows that, except 
for the effect of employment status – manual worker and professional worker – on support for 
European integration, all predictors are significant. The effects of our central variables that tap 
into a respondents’ insecurity in regard to his or her economic position are significant and in 
the expected direction, as is the variable measuring the sense of exclusive national belonging. 
The more citizens worry about their economic position and the more they view their national 
identity as exclusive, the lower support for the European Union and the process of European 
integration tends to be. A comparison of these effects shows that exclusive national identity 
has a stronger effect on EU and EI support than economic anxiety. Whereas a one-unit 
increase in economic anxiety reduces EU support by a factor of .082, viewing your national 
identity as exclusive rather than inclusive lessens support for the EU by a factor three times as 
large. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 The Eurobarometer data employed in this analysis measure support for the EU and for the process of European 
integration within the EU-15. The regression analyses presented here pool the data for these 15 individual 
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Table 2: Determinants of Support for the European and Support for the  
Process of European Integration (Pooled OLS-Regression Analyses)3 
 
 Support for the EU 
 
Support for the Process of EI 
 (1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
Exclusive National Identity -.308** -.300** -.258** -.255** 
     
Economic Anxiety -.082** -.103** -.068** -.078** 
     
Trust in National Institutions .194** .182** .158** .152** 
     
Satisfaction with National 
Democracy .144** .155** .132** .134** 
     
Manual Worker -.026** -.034** -.009 -.015 
     
Professional Worker .018+ .016+ -.011 -.011 
     
United Kingdom Dummy - -.093** - .062** 
     
Sweden Dummy - -.119** - .006** 
     
Portugal Dummy - .129**  -.101** 
   -  
Ireland Dummy - .126**  -.117** 
   -  
R² .22 .28 .15 .18 
F-Test 461.7** 421.7** 255.4** 189.3** 
N 9681 9681 8498 8498 
Note: Table entries are standardized OLS regression estimates. + p< .10, * p< .05, ** p<.01. 
 
Of course, we assume that citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and towards European 
integration are explained in the same manner, no matter the context (the assumption of causal 
homogeneity). But we know that the context, particularly country, does matter (although we 
do not always know exactly why and how). It makes sense, therefore, to re-specify the model, 
including contextual variables that can be expected to affect the causal logic. So, when we add 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries into one regression model. 
3 We also ran the pooled resgression analyses with socioeconomic control variables, i.e. income, education and 
gender. The relative strength, direction and significance of the individual predictors did not change substantially. 
On the basis of this finding, we only report the regressions with the sunstantive indicators.  
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dummies for exceptionally EU-skeptical and extremely pro-EU countries to the regression 
equations (simulating the contextual effect), we find that the effect of economic anxiety 
increases, whereas the impact of exclusive identity remains stable or decreases slightly. This 
result is in line with our expectations, as the incorporation of these dummies are decreasing 
causal heterogeneity.  There are clear country differences with regard to the mean levels of 
EU and EI support (see the table in appendix III). Sweden, the United Kingdom show much 
lower levels of support, whereas support for the EU and European integration is at a clearly 
higher level in Portugal and Ireland, hence, hinting at possible contextual effects on EU and 
EI support. The coefficients for the respective country dummies – which are all significant 
and in the expected direction – underline the assumption that the explanation for EU and EI 
varies across countries. So, the fact that the relative strength of the economic anxiety predictor 
increases, confirms our theoretical expectations, when country effects are controlled for. The 
slight decrease in the impact of exclusive national identity can be explained by the fact that 
pro-EU publics more often view their national identity to coincide with feelings of European 
identity (see Netjes and Edwards 2004). 
Overall, the results of the pooled OLS regressions indicate that both feelings of 
economic anxiety and of exclusive national belonging decrease citizen support for the EU and 
the process of European integration. Moreover, trust in national institutions and satisfaction 
with one’s own democracy have a positive effect on levels of EU and EI support. However, 
the relatively large and significant effects of the country dummies indicate that explanations 
for EU and EI support vary significantly across countries. This indicates that causal 
heterogeneity is a fact to reckon with. In fact, the results are such, that it seems prudent if not 
necessary to employ a multi-level model that is capable of accounting for these country 
differences in causality and that allows us to estimate potential interactions between 
individual level and country characteristics in a single model. 
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4.2 A Multilevel Model 
 
A multilevel modeling approach is useful for three reasons: First of all, as said, a 
multilevel model can account for causal heterogeneity. Although the country dummies we 
used in the pooled OLS regressions absorb some subgroup (in this case, country) differences, 
they do not provide any information regarding which characteristics of the subgroups actually 
matter for EU and EI support. Contrary to a country dummies model, a multilevel model 
enables us to account substantively for causal heterogeneity (Steenbergen and Jones 
2002:220). A multilevel model provides a test for the generalizability of findings across 
different contexts. Particular country characteristics, namely inflation, unemployment and the 
vote share of extreme left and extreme right parties, provide important political contexts that 
interact with individual attributes, namely economic anxiety and exclusive national identity, 
to produce certain political effects. Using a multi-level approach allows us to examine how 
the economic and political contexts shape individual differentiation in EU or EI support 
respectively.  
Secondly, due to the structure of the data, which samples individuals from 15 different 
countries, we need be sensitive to the hierarchical structure within the data. The pooled OLS 
regression analyses demonstrated that contextual effects matter when we attempt to explain 
EU and EI support. By ignoring the fact that the respondents are sampled from the same 
context, i.e. countries, one disregards the fact that individual observations are not 
independent. Rather, they are clustered and hence duplicate one another to a certain extent 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002:220). “[T]he more individuals share common experiences due to 
closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or to a certain extent, duplications of 
each other” (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998:9). In this line of reasoning, although our data are 
collected at the individual level, we have to be aware that individuals reside within one 
 20 
country and are therefore more likely to share common characteristics with other citizens in 
the same country than with citizens of another country. Because the clustering of the data is a 
particular statistical problem, we must use a method to estimate models with multilevel data 
that takes into account the associated problems with standard errors. 
Thirdly, as outlined in the previous section, we are not only interested in examining 
variation both at the individual and the country level, but also in the extent to which these 
levels interact. We expect cueing effects of parties on the extreme right and left as well as 
interactions between respondents’ subjective understanding of their economic situation and 
the factual country’s economic situation – measured through inflation and unemployment. 
These micro–macro interactions can only be modeled using a multilevel model.  
 
BOX 1 The two-level hierarchical linear model (HLM) 
In order to examine the effect of contextual factors on the relationship between exclusive 
national identity, economic anxiety and EU or EI support respectively, we use a two-level 
hierarchical linear model (HLM) that combines both individual-level measures from the 
Eurobarometer 60.1 survey and country-level indicators. As contextual measures are constant 
for individual cases residing within a given country, using standard modeling techniques such 
as (logistic) regression violates the assumption of independent observations. The result is that 
estimates of standard errors are reduced which increases the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when accepting the null is more appropriate. HLM avoids this by estimating 
distinct models at each level and by estimating unique level 1 models for each level 2 unit 
(Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). 
For our purposes, we estimate distinct individual level models that test the influences 
of national identity, economic anxiety and other variables on EU and EI support for each 
country. Next, we estimate a second level model that uses the country-level contextual 
measures to account for variation in the effects of the individual variables. In effect, this 
allows each country to have unique intercepts (average EU or EI support respectively), slopes 
(effects of individual characteristics, such as national identity and economic anxiety, on EU 
and EI support), and error terms. At the second level, contextual effects are estimated by 
modeling the slopes for the influence of national identity and economic anxiety on support  
for the EU and EI respectively (i.e. the level 1 slope estimates are treated as dependent 
variables). 
 
We begin our analysis of EU and EI support by defining a level 1 (individual-level) 
model for both dependent variables. The model are represented by equation 1, where 
EUsupportij is EU support for each respondent (i) and country (j) and EIsupportij is EI support 
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for each respondent and country. ExIdentityij is a dummy variable for exclusive national 
identity, EcAnxij is a variable indicating a respondent’s level of economic anxiety, NatTrustij 
is a variable for the degree of trust in national political institutions, and NatDemoij measures a 
respondent’s satisfaction with democracy implemented in one’s own country. In addition to 
these variables, we include in the model two variables indicating the employment status of the 
respondents in the sample: Both Manualij and Professionalij are dummy variables, where 
manual worker status or professional worker status is coded 1. The model also includes an 
individual-level constant β0j, which enables us to bring in our level 2 (country-level) 
predictors.  
 
(1) EUsupportij or EIsupportij = β0j +β1jExIdentityij +β2j EcAnxij +β3NatTrusti+β4 NatDemoij + 
β5Manualij + β5Professionalij +rij 
 
 
For each level 2 case (in our analysis a country), a unique level 1 model is estimated. This 
produces intercept and slope estimates specific to each country. At the second level, each of 
the level 1 coefficients (and their intercepts) could become a potential dependent variable (for 
a more detailed discussion see Byrk and Raudenbush 1992). The level 2 model is represented 
by equation 2. Here, PubExpj denotes the level of public expenditure per capita in 2003 and 
Euroj is a dummy variable indicating if a country joined the Euro.  
 
(2) β0j = γ00+ γ01Pubexprj + γ02Euroj + δ0j 
 
Substituting equation 2 into equation 1 enables us to capture our multi-level model in a single 
equation.  
 
(3) EUsupportij or EIsupportij = γ00+ γ01Pubexprj + γ02Euroj + γ10ExIdentityij + γ20 EcAnxij + 
γ30NatTrustij + γ40NatDemoij + γ50Manualij + γ50Professionalij + δ0j + rij 
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The model specified in equation 3 is useful in that it brings together the predictors from the 
two levels. Moreover, since it does not assume that the predictors account for all of the 
variation in EU  and EI support at the two levels, the model yields variance components for δ0j 
and rij. This allows us to consider how to account for EU or EI support at different levels of 
analysis.  
The model described thus far assumes that level 1 predictors have fixed effects. Recall, 
however, that some of our central hypotheses suggests heterogeneity in the effect of two of 
our level 1 predictors, namely exclusive national identity and economic anxiety. In respect to 
exclusive national identity, we hypothesize rightwing populist parties to have a decisive role 
in mobilizing exclusive national identity against European integration. Moreover, we also 
expect cueing effects of radical left parties. These parties also oppose European integration, 
mainly on the basis of the neoliberal character of economic integration and mobilize feelings 
of economic anxiety and mobilize these fears against European integration. We also expect 
the level of inflation and unemployment to interact with the extent of economic anxiety. To 
model these interaction effects we must relax the assumption that exclusive national identity 
and economic anxiety, given by β1j  and β2j in equation 1, are fixed and instead stipulate that 
exclusive national identity varies as a function of rightwing populist parties and economic 
anxiety as a function of radical left parties, inflation as well as unemployment. Our final 
model is specified in equation 4 and includes the cross-level interaction ExIdentityij*Populistj, 
EcAnxij*RadLeftj EcAnxij*Inflationj, and EcAnxij*Umemployj.  
 
(4) EUsupportij or EIsupportij = γ00+ γ01Pubexprj + γ02Euroj + γ10ExIdentityij + γ20 EcAnxij + γ30 
NatTrustij + γ40NatDemoij + γ50Manualij + γ50Professionalij + γ15 ExIdentityij*Populistj + γ25 
EcAnxij*RadLeftj+ γ35 EcAnxij*Inflationj + γ45EcAnxij*Umemployj δ0j + δ1j ExIdentityij + δ2j 
EcAnxij + rij 
  
To ascertain if there is significant variation in EU and EI support at the individual and 
country levels, we conduct an analysis of variance on our indicators for EU and EI support. 
 23 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the overall mean and variance components are 
provided in table 3.4 The results from these “base models” suggest that the data indeed have a 
multi-level character. Both of the variance components are significant, providing evidence of 
considerable variance in EU and EI support at both the individual and the country levels. To 
obtain a better understanding of the relative importance of the various levels of analysis, we 
consider the ratio of each variance component to the total variance of support for EU and EI 
respectively. 89.4 percent of the variance in EU support is explained at the individual level 
(100*6.560/6.560+0.780), while only 10.6 percent is explained at the country level 
(100*0.780/6.560+0.780). In the case of EI support, an even larger component of the 
variance, i.e. 90.2 percent of the variance in EI support is explained at the individual level 
(100*1.112/1.112+0.121) and only 9.8 percent is explained at the country level 
(100*0.121/1.112+0.121). That such large parts of the variance are explained at the individual 
level is an expected consequence of the fact that the data are measured at the individual level 
(see also Steenbergen and Jones 2002:231). 
 
Table 3: Multilevel Data Variance Components 
 
 
Support for the European 
Union 
Support for the process of  
European Integration 
   
Fixed Effects   
Constant 0.213 0.057 
  (0.853) (0.813) 
Variance Components   
Country-Level 10.813* 9.788* 
 (3.989) (3.623) 
Individual Level 90.855* 90.105* 
 (1.127) (1.226) 
   
-2 x Log Likelihood 95699.620 79471.530 
   
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated 
standard errors in parentheses. * p< .05. 
                                                 
4 All estimates included in this paper were obtained using MLwiN V1.1. 
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Having established that there is in fact significant variation in both EU and EI support 
at both the individual and country levels of analysis, we can consider whether a fully specified 
model can account for this variance. Table 4 presents two different models to account for the 
variance in EU and EI support. These models differ in respect to the interaction terms 
included in the equations. Due to possible problems with multicollinearity, we have not 
included all three interaction effects with economic anxiety and country level predictors in 
one model. The first model includes the interaction between economic anxiety and vote share 
of radical left parties and the second one includes interactions between economic anxiety as 
well as inflation and unemployment. The maximum likelihood estimates of the fixed effects 
and the variance components of the multi-level model are provided in the bottom part of table 
4. Comparing these results to those provided in table 3, we find that both models for EU and 
EI support respectively are significant improvements over their respective base models: EU 
support: model 1 χ2 =25085.1 and model 2: χ2 =25084.7; EI support model 1: χ2 =18201.7 and 
model 2 χ2 = 18203.2, df=13, p<.01. This indicates that at least some of the predictors 
included in both our model have effects that are significantly different from zero. 
By comparing the respective variance components presented in table 4 with those 
reported in table 3 (see Steenbergen and Jones 2002:232), we can also asses the explanatory 
power of all the individual level and all the country level predictors,. In the case of EU 
support, the difference in the individual level variance component is 90.855-69.253=21.602. 
Relative to the size of the base model variance component, this is a reduction of 
21.602/90.855=0.24. Thus, the individual level variance component explains 24 percent of the 
individual level variance in EU support. The explained country variation in EU support is 34 
percent in the first model (e.g. 10.813-7.157=3.656; 3.656/10.813=0.34) and 38 percent in the 
second model (10.813-6.676=4.137; 4.137/10.813=0.38). So, the country predictors in our 
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model can explain a larger part of country variation in EU support than the portion of 
individual level variation in EU support that is accounted for by individual level predictors.  
The overall explanatory power of the individual level in the case of EI support is lower 
in comparison to EU support, while  all the country level predictors explain a larger portion of 
the country variation in support for European integration than in the case of EU support. In 
model 1 the country predictors explain 43 percent of the country variation in EI support 
(9.788-5.562=4.226;4.226/9.788=0.43), whereas the independent variables at the country 
level in model 2 explain 46 percent (9.788-5.309=4.479; 4.479/9.788=0.46). The portion of 
the variance in EI support accounted for by the individual level predictors in both models is 
merely 17 percent (model 1: 90.105-75.060=15.045; 15.045/90.105=0.17, model 2: 90.105-
75.052=15.053; 15.053/90.105=0.17). As demonstrated through the comparison of the R² 
statistics of the pooled OLS regression for EU support on the one hand and EI support on the 
other, the multilevel results show that the overall individual fit of the model is better for EU 
than EI support, as the individual level predictors explain a larger part of the individual level 
variation of support for the EU. However, the multilevel results also demonstrate that the 
country level predictors can explain a larger share of the country variation in support for 
European integration than they can in respect to the variation among countries in the level of 
EU support.  
In sum, the examination of the different variance components using a multilevel 
modeling approach shows that causal heterogeneity exists both in EU and EI support. Hence 
the multilevel model highlights the importance of acknowledging the clustering of our data 
and recognizing the fact that the respondents are sampled from the same context, i.e. 
countries. Furthermore, the analysis of the variance components shows that although the fit of 
the model at the individual level is better in the case of EU support – this is in correspondence 
with the findings of the pooled OLS regression analyses – the fit at the country level is greater 
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with regard to EI support. Finally, our model explains more of the country variation in EU 
and EI support than of the individual level variance. 
If we now turn to the individual parameter estimates in table 4, we find considerable 
support for our main hypotheses. The maximum likelihood estimates of our four central 
indicators, exclusive national identity, economic anxiety, trust in national institutions and 
satisfaction with national democracy, are all significant and in the expected direction. When 
we compare the relative strength of the individual level indicators, we can conclude that the 
negative impact of exclusive national identity on both EU and EI support is at least twice as 
large as the effect of economic anxiety. In line with our expectations and the findings of the 
pooled OLS regression, both feelings of economic anxiety and of exclusive national 
belonging decrease citizen support for the EU and the process of European integration. 
Moreover, trust in national institutions and satisfaction with one’s own democracy increase 
both types of support. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Support for the European and Support for the  
Process of European Integration (Multilevel Analysis) 
 
 Support for the EU 
Support for the Process 
of EI 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Fixed Effects     
Constant 0.680 0.836 0.634 1.057+ 
 (0.745) (0.690) (0.681) (0.625) 
Exclusive National Identity -0.302** -0.302** -0.262** -0.262** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Economic Anxiety -0.140** -0.129** -0.115** -0.099** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) 
Trust in National Institutions 0.188*** 0.188** 0.144** 0.144** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Satisfaction with National 
Democracy 0.196** 0.196** 0.147** 0.147** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Manual Worker -0.020* -0.020* -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Professional Worker 0.015+ 0.015+ -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Public Expenditure 0.142* 0.127+ 0.245** 0.249** 
 (0.073) (0.071) (0.064) (0.064) 
Euro -0.135+ -0.149* 0.057 0.036 
 (0.076) (0.072) (0.067) (0.064) 
National Exclusive Identity* 
Vote Share of Populist 
Rightwing Parties 
-0.179** 
 
-0.177** 
 
-0.140** 
 
-0.140** 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) 
Economic Anxiety*Vote 
Share of Radical Left Parties -0.058 - -0.107+ - 
 (0.063)  (0.070)  
Economic Anxiety*Inflation - -0.009 - -0.005 
  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Economic Anxiety* 
Unemployment - -0.044* - -0.046* 
  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Variance Components     
     
Country-Level 7.157* 6.676* 5.562* 5.309** 
 (2.653) (2.477) (2.060) (1.988) 
Individual-Level 69.253** 69.235** 75.060** 75.052** 
 (0.982) (0.981) (1.149) (1.149) 
-2 x Log Likelihood 70614.510 70614.890 61269.770 61268.340 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard 
errors in parentheses. + p< .10, * p< .05, ** p<.01. 
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At the country level, we find that only the effect of public expenditure is significant 
throughout the four different models. Public expenditure has a larger effect on EI support than 
on support for the EU. The effect of the Euro, however, is only significant in the case of EU 
support. In line with our expectations, the effect of the Euro decreases citizens support for the 
Union. The analyses also point at the relevance of the hypothesized interaction effects 
between individual level and country characteristics, although not all of these effects were 
significant. We find clear evidence for the cueing of rightwing populist parties in terms of 
exclusive national identity. The interaction between exclusive national identity and the vote 
share of rightwing populist parties decreases support in the EU and the integration process. 
Hence, these parties clearly mobilize exclusive national identity against the EU and the 
integration process. We also find cueing effects of radical left parties in terms of economic 
anxiety, however, only in the case of EU support. The cueing effects of these parties decrease 
EU support. These results indicate the importance of including cueing effects when dealing 
with citizen support for the EU and the process of European integration, hence speaking to a 
larger debate regarding the role of elites in public opinion towards the EU.5 
We also find evidence with regard to the interaction between objective macro 
economic conditions and subjective micro economic perceptions. However, only the 
interaction effect between unemployment and economic anxiety is significant. The 
unemployment rate exacerbates the negative effect of economic anxiety on EU and EI 
support. However, in comparison to the party cueing effects this impact is minimal. Inflation 
does not significantly interact with economic anxiety to decrease EU and EI support.  
 
 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that on the basis of previous research (Wessels 1995, for contradicting results see 
Carubba 1998 and Edwards 2004) we assume that the relationship between elites and the public regarding the 
EU issue is top-down. However, this analysis can not assure the empirical validity of this assumption. Moreover, 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that theoretically the utilitarian and the identity perspectives 
on what determines attitudes of national publics to the EU do not represent conflicting views. 
They seem to be dealing with the same causal mechanisms that underlie both a logic of 
interests and a logic of identity. Therefore, we proposed to include interest- and identity-based 
accounts of support for the EU and European integration into one single explanatory 
framework that draws on the concept of political allegiance. The concept of allegiance is 
meant to offer a solution of what we identified as the under-specification of the causal 
mechanism in the utilitarian approach and the indeterminate reasoning of the identity 
perspective. We theorized security and well-being as the chief benefits for national publics 
offered by a government. Developing this idea of political allegiance, we formulated the 
hypothesis that support for the EU on the part of the European citizenry tends to be lower 
when citizens perceive the process of integration as a threat to their vital interests and/or 
feelings of national identity, heightening their social psychological and socioeconomic 
anxiety. We tested our hypothesis using public opinion data collected in the 60.1 
Eurobarometer survey from November 2003 and employing various techniques. 
In our regression analyses, we found that the more citizens worry about their economic 
position and the more they view their national identity as exclusive, the lower the support for 
the European Union and the process of European integration tends to be. Exclusive national 
identity seems to have a stronger effect on EU and EI support than economic anxiety. Since 
the causal logic we thought applicable does not turn out to be identical across national 
contexts, we also learned that – when we control for causal heterogeneity (adding country 
dummies) – the effect of economic anxiety increases, whereas the impact of exclusive identity 
remains stable or decreases slightly. We understood this as confirming our theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                        
the authors of this paper are fully aware of the debate within the field of EU studies regarding the top-down or 
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expectations. Still, both feelings of economic anxiety and of exclusive national belonging 
were found to lower citizens’ support for the EU and the process of European integration. On 
the other hand, we found that trust in national institutions and satisfaction with one’s own 
democracy tend to boost EU and support for European integration. 
The finding that explanations for EU and EI support vary significantly across countries 
implied that a multi-level model is more appropriate as such a model is capable of accounting 
for causal heterogeneity (at country level) and of estimating potential interactions between the 
individual level and the country characteristics. We therefore developed and tested a 
multilevel model, finding that causal heterogeneity exists both in EU and EI support. In line 
with our expectations and the findings of the regression analyses, we again established that 
both feelings of economic anxiety and of exclusive national belonging clearly decrease citizen 
support for the EU and for the process of European integration. We also found that the 
negative impact of exclusive national identity on both EU and EI support is much stronger 
than the effect of economic anxiety, whereas trust in national institutions and satisfaction with 
one’s own democracy increase both types of support. In addition, we found that public 
expenditure is positively related to support, while the Euro decreases citizens support for the 
Union. Moreover, rightwing populist parties clearly cue in terms of exclusive national identity 
and they seem to mobilize feelings of exclusive national identity against the EU and the 
integration process. Radical left parties do the same in terms of economic anxiety, but only in 
the case of mobilizing against the EU. 
 In sum, the results reported in this paper are in line with our theoretical concept of 
(double) allegiance and indicate that support for supranational institutions depends on the 
extent to which supra-national institutions allow national political elites to provide political, 
social-psychological and socio-economic security and well-being. Our conclusion is that we 
                                                                                                                                                        
bottom-up nature of this relationship.  
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have reason to underline the notion that both EU and EI support are nested in citizens’ 
primary allegiance to the national system. Double allegiance exists in a trade-off with the 
extent to which security (and prosperity for that matter) are safeguarded. 
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6. Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Results of the Principal Component Analyses: 
 
Table A1: Support for the European Union 
 
 Component 1 
EU Membership good/bad .715 
Regret EU Dissolution .838 
EU Image .856 
EU Attitude .828 
Note: This component explains 65.8 % of variance 
 
Table A2: Support for the Process of European Integration 
 
 Component 1 
In Favor of Political 
Integration 
.674 
Support EU Enlargement .849 
Inclusion of New Member 
States Top Priority 
.760 
Note: This component explains 54.8 % of variance 
 
Appendix II: Description of Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables Description 
Support for the European Union (EU 
support)  
Index of 4 variables: 
 
This index is centered around the mean. 
EU Membership good/bad Generally speaking do you think (your 
country’s) membership in the Union is a good 
thing, a bad thing or neither good or bad? 1) 
good thing, 2) bad thing and 3)neither good 
nor bad. (coding 1=1, good thing, 2=3, neither 
good/nor bad, 2=3, bad thing)  
Regret EU Dissolution If you were told tomorrow that the European 
Union were scrapped, would you be very 
sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved? 
(1=very sorry, 2=indifferent, 3=very relieved) 
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EU image In general, does the European Union conjure 
for you a very positive, fairly positive, 
neutral, fairly negative or very negative 
image? (1=very positive; 5=very negative) 
EU Attitude Does the EU give you personally a feeling 
of…? (0=enthusiasm, hope, trust ; 
1=indifference, anxiety, mistrust, rejecting it) 
Support for the Process of European 
integration (EI support) 
Index of 3 variables 
 
This index is centered around the mean. 
In Favor of Political Union Are you, yourself, for or against the 
development towards a European political 
union? (1=for, 2=against) 
Support EU Enlargement What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it. 4. The 
enlargement of the European Union to include 
more countries (1=for, 2=against) 
Inclusion of New Member States Top Priority I am going to read out a list of actions that the 
European Union could undertake. For each 
one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it 
should be a priority, or not? 1. Welcoming 
new member countries (1=for, 2=against) 
Independent Variables ~ Individual Level:  
Exclusive National Identity A dummy variable based on the following 
question: “In the near future, do you see 
yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) 
[nationality] and European, (3) European and 
[nationality], or (4) European only?” (coding: 
1=1: nationality only, 0= 2,3,4: nationality 
and European, European and nationality, 
European only).  
Economic Anxiety Combined index measuring prospective 
economic conditions of respondent, including 
two questions: 
1. What are your expectations for the year to 
come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same 
when it comes to the financial situation of 
your household? 
2. What are your expectations for the year to 
come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same 
when it comes to your personal job situation? 
Trust in National Institutions Combined index measuring trust in political 
parties, national government and national 
parliament6 (1=high trust; 6=low trust). This 
index is centered around the mean. 
                                                 
6 The dimensionality of 6 trust items measuring trust in political institutions was using a scaling procedure called 
Mokken Scale Analysis for Polychotomous Items (MSP software ,see Debets and Brouwer (1989)). The MSP 
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Satisfaction with National Democracy On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not satisfied at 
all with the way democracy works in your 
country? (1=very satisfied; 4=not satisfied at 
all) 
Manual Worker What is your current occupation? (1=manual, 
unskilled worker; 0=other type of worker) 
Professional Worker What is your current occupation? 
(1=professional, skilled worker; 0=other type 
of worker) 
Independent Variables ~ Country Level:  
Public Expenditure Total level of public expenditure as 
percentage of GDP Source: OECD 
Euro Dummy variable indicating if a country is a 
member of the Euro zone (1=yes, 0=no). 
Variables used in Interaction Effects:  
Vote Share of Populist Rightwing Parties % of votes of these parties in last 
parliamentary election prior to 2003. Source: 
www.electionworld.org 
Vote Share of Radical Left Parties % of votes of these parties  in last 
parliamentary election prior to 2003. Source: 
www.electionworld.org 
Inflation Percentage change in inflation from 2002-
2003.  Source: OECD  
Unemployment Standardized unemployment rate 2003. 
Source:  OECD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
program extracted one dimension including trust in political parties, national government and national 
parliament and the scale coefficient (H:.57) indicated that this scale is a strong scale. 
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Appendix III: Country Differences in EU and EI Support, 2003 
 
 EU support 
(min = 1, high support; max= 
9, low support) 
EI support 
(max = 1, high support; 
min = 4, low support) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Ireland 2.61 2.17 1.81 1.03 
Portugal 2.88 2.31 2.06 1.01 
Luxembourg 2.92 2.16 2.54 1.04 
Italy 2.96 2.39 2.03 0.94 
Spain  2.97 2.02 1.82 0.90 
Greece 3.11 2.21 1.82 0.92 
Belgium 3.81 2.38 2.56 0.99 
Netherlands  3.87 2.63 2.43 1.11 
Germany 4.06 2.61 2.55 1.07 
Denmark 4.23 2.93 2.15 1.10 
France 4.41 2.77 2.80 1.02 
Austria 4.74 2.73 2.55 1.21 
Finland 4.90 2.70 2.77 1.04 
Sweden 5.25 2.75 2.42 1.18 
United Kingdom 5.26 2.83 2.79 1.14 
 
 
 
Appendix IV: Populist Rightwing Parties: 
 
 Right-Wing Populist Party 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Freedom Party of Austria 
Belgium Vlaams Blok Flemish Block 
 Front National National Front 
Denmark Dansk Folkepartie Danish Peoples’ Party 
France Front National National Front 
 Mouvement pour la France Movement for France 
Italy Allianza Nationale National Alliance 
 Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra 
Nazionale 
Italian Social Movement –Far Right  
Netherlands Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn 
Sweden Ny Demokrati New Democracy 
British National Party  United 
Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party  
Note: All parties included here 1. received at least one parliamentary seat or two percent of the 
vote in the last parliamentary election prior to 2003 (source: www.electionworld.org) 2. can be 
classified as EU-skeptical on the basis of country expert judgments (Source: Expert Data Set 
on European Integration 2003 conducted by Hooghe et al.) 
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Appendix V: Radical Left Parties:  
 
 Radical Left Parties 
Denmark Socialistisk Folkeparti  
Enhedslisten (de rød grønne) 
Socialist People’s Party 
Unity List (red-green) 
Finland Vasemmistoliitto Left Alliance 
France Parti Communiste Français 
Parti Radical de Gauche 
French Communist Party 
Left Radical Party 
Greece Kommounistiko Komma Ellado Communist Party of Greece 
Italy Rifondazione Communista Party of Communist Refoundation 
Netherlands Socialistische Partij Socialist Party 
Portugal Coligação Democrática Unitária Unitary Democratic Coalition 
Spain Izquierda Unida United Left 
Sweden Vänsterpartiet Left Party 
Note: All parties included here 1. received at least one parliamentary seat or two percent of the 
vote in the last parliamentary election prior to 2003 (source: www.electionworld.org) 2. can be 
classified as EU-skeptical on the basis of country expert judgments (Source: Expert Data Set 
on European Integration 2003 conducted by Hooghe et al.)  
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